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Comparative analysis of experience on public policy of different countries
is hazardous. This is especially true for environmental quality where pub-
lic and governmental attitudes and values have been changing so rapidly.
In 1960, the terms "environment" and environmental quality" were in
the lexicon of few public policy makers, except for specialists in public
health. By 1965, scholars and public policymakers were using the terms
as a means of organizing analysis and defining problems related to various
types of pollution—air, water, and land.1 And by 1970, environmental
quality had become a major issue of national policy in this country and
that of most developed nations, including Canada and Japan, as well as
Eastern and Western Europe.
The views presented in this paper are the result of observations of this
dynamic process at work in Europe and the United States in late 1970
and 1971—the very period when environmental quality policies and pro-
NOTE: This work was supported in part by EPA Research Project R-800901.
1. Lynton K. Caidwell, A New Focus for Public Policy?" Public Ad.
ministration Review Vol. 23 (September 1963): pp. 132—139. Allen Kneese and Orris
Herfindahl, Quality of the Environment (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future,
Inc., 1965); "Restoring the QualityOur Environment," Report of the Environmental
Pollution Panel, President's Science Advisory Committee, The White House (1965).
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cedures were being forged, and when the countries were working together to
in preparing for the U.N. Stockholm Conference on the Human Environ-
ment held in June of 1972. The results presented here are accordingly
modest in scope and content. They are akin to a snapshot taken about the
middle of 1971—one that shows only general outlines rather than fine-
grained detail. Furthermore, it is a view that is affected by the approach
of this observer, which is that of public investment analysis.
Outline of the Approach as
The approach used to describe the experiences is a straight-forward ver-
sion of the public investment or benefit-cost model with the important
addition of an objective labeled"environmental quality," thatisas- wil
sumed to be distinguished from the "economic efficiency" objective.2 In
summary terms, we include a multivalued objective function of the usual
form: an
max + aQt(yt) —M5(xt)—
(1 + r)t
where E, M, and K are economic efficiency benefits, operation, mainte-
en
nance and replacement costs, and capital costs, respectively; Q is envi-
C
ronmental quality "benefits," and a is a weighting factor that trans[orms
0
Q benefits into the metric of £ benefits.
Associated with the objective function are the usual relationships of
costs to inputs, M = 1(x) and K = 1(x); benefit to outputs, E = f(y) and p
Q = 1(y); and outputs to inputs, y = f(x), which we also know as the pro-
duction function.
Because contributions to environmental quality (in addition to those
that can be expressed and measured in economic efficiency terms) can at
best be expressed in physical, quantitative terms, and because environ- N1
mental quality weights are hard to come by, and perhaps impossible Pu
of
2. An earlier formulation of this approach is contained in an unpublished paper of
mine entitled "Environmental Planning with Special Relation to Natural Resources,"
revised, Dcc. 1966; further discussion is contained in my paper "Environmental Qual-
ity as a Policy & Planning Objective," Journal of the American institute of Planners,
Vol. 37, No. 4 (July, 1971). In order to keep the exposition simple. income redistribu-
tion, either as an objective to be achieved or as a consequence whose value isto be
checked, has been omitted from the approach. In general, income distribution must
be taken into account in multiple-objective public investment analysis.1
MANAGEMENTOF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 437
er to determine a priori, a more realistic formulation of the objective func-










nt when Qt* (which along with isalmost always a vector) represents a
In
minimum level of environmental quality to be achieved in year t.
al We recognize this formulation as consistent with the familiar "stand-
ards" strategy commonly used in the United States. But, in terms of the
approach outlined here, the crucial issue is the weight that is implicit in
the standard or set of standards in any given situation of public invest-
ment or resource allocation.
This approach is closely related to the formulations of the problem of
environmental quality management by Kneese and other economists con-
te- cerned with the economics of environmental quality.5 Obviously, many
V1 ofthe important problems and issues of environmental economics are
not made explicit in this simple formulation. Accordingly, the descrip-
tion and comparisons to follow will rely primarily on the bam-ebones ap-
proach set forth above.
'se Overall Policies on Environmental Quality
at
Nineteen hundred and seventy was a watershed year for environmental
)le policy in both the United States and Western Europe. Beginning in that
year, legislation and administrative actions involving both the substance
of problems and organization for problem solving were framed in terms
of overall environmental quality rather than exclusively, as in the past, in
a," termsof air pollution, water pollution, solid waste management, pesti-
a cides damages, and the like. Because this broader policy framework is so
USL
3.A. V. Kneese and B. T. Bower, Managing Waler Quality: Econo,nics,Technology,
Institutions (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future. inc. 1968).1
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new, the administrative workings of government are still busy adjusting
to it. It is possible, therefore, to examine the present situation with some vel
assurance that the new policy framework will be stable at least over the a
next few years. Public and governmental concern for environmental qual- 1ev
ity is not a passing fad; it is gradually, but steadily, being assimilated into H
governmental policy and administrative practice in both the United itY:
States and Europe.
The United States
After about ten years of working up to the action incrementally, in 1970 and,
the federal government adopted the objective of environmental quality as ag1
a major national goal on a par with economic development, employment, wa
and price stability. esta
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (signed by the
President on January 1, 1970) and the newly created Environmental Pro-
tectiori Administration are the two chief instruments of this basic change
in policy, but many other administrative, regulatory, and legal actions
provide support.4 prc
NEPA established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in the
e
White House in the image of the Council of Economic Advisers. NEPA
tI
alsorequired that an "environmental impact statement" be prepared be- °Pi
fore any federal action that significantly affects the environment is taken.5
In a landmark decision on the Calvert Cliffs case, a Federal District Court
an1
ruled that federal agencies, in this case the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), must comply with this requirement in a substantive way.° Signifi-
h cantly, the Executive Branch decided not to appeal this decision, and
AEC changed its procedures to conform with the Court's interpretation
m
ofthelaw.7
1n a parallel and related development the U.S. Water Resources Coun-
in
cii in December 1971 formally proposed that environmental quality be
m
included as a national objective of water resource planning, with status
81
4. See Environmental Quality, Third Annual Report ot the Council on Environ-
mental Quality. U.S.G.P.O., August 1972.
1 5. See Richard N. L. Andrews, 'Three Fronts of Federal Environmental Policy,"
Journal Apnerican institute of Planners Vol. 37, No. 4 (July 1971): pp. 258—266; and
b Richard N. L. Andrews, "Environmental Policy and Administrative Change: The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1970—1971," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1972.
6. Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449F.2d (D.C.Cir.l971).
7. AEC revised regulations (10 CFR 50, Appendix D). P
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equal to the objectives of national economic efficiency and regional de-
velopment. Intensive public discussion of the Council's proposals over
he
a period revealed major differences of view as to appropriate
levels of discount rate, and validity of the regional development objective.
to However, there was overwhelming approval of the environmental qual-
d ity objective, and a majority of respondents on the issue expressed the
view that the objective should be given top priority.8
Environmental quality as a major policy was also institutionalized in
1970 through the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency
via transfer of air, water quality and solid waste management functions,
70
and pesticides and radiation regulation from existing departments and
agencies.9 Administration of the major environmental quality programs
aS was brought together, and a powerful advocate for the environment was
tt, established.
In fact, however, the relative weight to be given environmental quality
as compared with national and regional economic development in public
investment decisions has not been determined by Congress, the Execu-
tive, or the Judiciary. Weights are being established implicitly in the
(iS process of making decisions on specific projects and programs, in which
e environmentalists and supporters of economic development along with
their allies in the Congress and the administrative agencies take strongly
Opposing positions.
But it is clear that a series of court decisions, administrative actions,
and Congressional followups since 1970 have confirmed that environ-
mental quality is a major national goal, not to be lightly disregarded.1°
fi. Furthermore, via the requirement for environmental impact statements,
the issue of environmental quality must be faced in every public invest-
ment plan and program directly or indirectly supported by the federal
government. In this sense, we can assert that, conceptually, federal public
investment plans and programs have multiple.objective functions, one
major element of which is environmental quality.1'
Js
8. U. S. WaterResourcesCouncil, Summary Analysis,Washington,July 1972.
9. Presidents Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, July 9, 1970, effective December 2,
1970.
10. Environmental Quality, Chapters 4 and 7.
Il. Only time will tell whether political commitment to environmental quality will
a- be as strong and consistent as has been the case, for example, for economic growth and
fullemployment during the uventy.five yeats following enactment of the Employment
Act of 1946. But the continuing strength of public support for environmental quality
values, and concomitant actions by the courts, and federal and state legislatures, sup-
port the view that environmental quality is now firmly established as a national goal.140- MAYNARDHUFSCHMIDT M
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The United Kingdom re1
Concern for air and water pollution is of long standing in Britain, pre-
dating that in the United States. But, as in this country, the environ- a
mental quality issue as such has emerged only recently. In October 1969,
the Labour Government took the first official step concerning overall en-
vironmental quality policy by giving the newly established Secretary of
State for Local Government and Regional Planning coordinating respon-
sibilities for all governmental action on control of environmental pollu-
W1
tion.12 These responsibilities had previously been scattered among ten
ministries. This action was followed by setting up in February, 1970, a
standing Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution,13 and in May,
1970, by issuance of a White Paper on protection of the environment.14
The White Paper was very low key in tone and did little more than sketch
a the nature of problems, the current situation, and modest proposals for
governmental action. Thus, when the Labour Government was turned out
in the summer of 1970, only the first preliminary steps had been taken
tic
to deal with environmental quality as a major policy issue.
The environmental issue was given considerable attention by the Con-
servative Government in its White Paper on central government reorgan. in ization of October 15, 1970, which announced establishment of a super- th
Department of the Environment, unifying the Ministries of Housing and
Local Government, Public Buildings and Works, and Transport under a
1
Secretary of State for the Environment.15 In the U. S. context this amounts
to creating a super-department combining the present Departments of
Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation plus the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and the regional development functions of
the Economic Development Agency and the Appalachian Regional Com-
mission. Although the mandate of this new Department was much rn
broader than environmental quality, the agency was charged with such le
major environmental matters as 'the preservation of amenity, the pro-
tection of the coast and countryside, the preservation of historic towns
and monuments, and the control of air, water, and noise pollution." 16
ati
12. The Protection of the Environment: The Fight Against Pollution, Cmzul 4573. La
H.M.S.O., May, 1970, p. 6. gr
13. Royal Commission on EnvironmentalPollution,FirstReport, Cmnd 4585,
H.M.S.O., February, 1971, pp. iii, iv.
14. The Protection of the Environment, p. 6.
15. The Reorganization of Central Cos'enzment, Cnsnd 4506, H.M.S.O., October 15,
1970.
16. Reorganization of Central Government, Cmnd 4506, EcIDT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 441
Ofspecial significance was the bringing together of land use, transport,
regional development, and environmental quality programs and policy
into a single organization with representation at the highest level—via
re- a Secretary of State.
The U. K. stance with respect to environmental quality can be inferred
in part from the first report of the Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution filed in February An admirably well-balanced docu-
of ment, this report states the problem as one of how to strike a balance be-
Dfl tween 'benefits gained from economic and technological achievements"
Ilu- and losses from "deterioration of the environment." In principle, re-
ten sources devoted to reducing pollution, as compared with other claims,
a should depend on the relevant costs and benefits. Because of great diffi-
ay, culties in making such calculations, the report noted that decisions may
t. still have to be made in the absence of satisfactory information on costs
tch
I andbenefits, and'in the end. . .muststillreflect subjective value
for judgments."
)ut In contrast to the United States action on NEPA, the U. K. organiza.
:en tional and policy initiatives did not, by themselves, raise environmental
quality to the level of a national objective; there was no policy statement
0fl to this effect in the British enabling legislation analogous to the statement
an- in NEPA. Yet U. K. initiative appears to give increasing importance to
per- the objective.
nd In some respects, the change in U. K. policy toward environmental
r quality has been less striking than in the United States. British legislation
fltS and on-going programs in air and water pollution, noise and oil pollution
0 have a much longer history than those in the United States. For example,
On- national noise abatement legislation dates from 1960 in the U. K., and
0 has only recently (1972) been enacted in the United States.
Thus, the change in Britain has been less in new legislation than in
ic more active use of existing laws. Public awareness of environmental prob.
ich lems has increased, and various public alarms over toxic wastes—lead and
ro- . cyanide—andDDT have generated a more sensitive attitude on the part
of government. But, no political party in the U. K. has raised the envi-
ronmental question to the level of a major issue. And, while the issue has
attained considerable importance with the younger generation, it has
873, failed to gain widespread public concern on a par with issues of economic
585, growth, inflation, unemployment, and housing.'8
15, 17. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, First Report.
18. Based, in part, on personal communication from David Pearce, Department of
Economics, The University of Southampton, November 30, 1972.442 - MAYNARDHUFSCHMIDT
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Although it is hazardous to generalize on this issue, it appears that the ac
general policy stance of the British is to avoid all out commitment of na-
tional resources to grand programs of environmental improvement and in
to favor a careful balancing of economic and environmental costs and te
benefits for specific projects and restricted programs. From available evi- of
dence one could infer that environmental quality has a status that is sub- tn
ordinate to economic objectives. But, at least some U. K. public invest-
ments take into account the objective of environmental quality.19
Air Quality Programs
The United States
In the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act, the United States made a
significant shift toward national minimum standards for both ambient sull
air quality and emissions from stationary sources and automobiles.2° Pri- P1
mary ambient air standards, based on health criteria, and secondary stand- po
ards, based on "aesthetics, vegetation and materials," were established on of
a uniform national basis for six pollutants: particulate matter, sulfur
oxides, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen, and photo- of
chemical oxidants. Implementation was left to the states which must meet sta
primary standards within three years and secondary standards within a tr
"reasonable" time21 National emission standards for 1975 model auto- so
mobiles require that emissions of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons be ti
90 per cent below the 1970 standards and, for 1976 model cars, emissions m
of oxides of nitrogen be 90 per cent below 1970 levels. Emission standards in
for major new stationary sources, including fossil fuel steam generators, co
portland cement plants, sulfuric and nitric acid plants, and large incin- of
erators, have also been established on a national basis. co
The Act leaves considerable flexibility to states and local "air quality th
control regions," typically metropolitan areas, in determining how to da
sta
19. For example the extensive studies of the Commission on the Third London Air- wh
port (theRoskill Commission) included exhaustive examination of environmental
quality aspects as well as economic costs and benefits. See Commissiononthe Third
London Airport, Report, London, H.M.S.O., 1971. However, U. K. nationalized indus- 2
tries arc not required to consider environmental effects. Also, to date, the Department Col
of the Environment does not require that appraisals of road investments incorporate an
evaluation of environmental effects. (David Pearce, November 30, 1972.)
20. Public Law 91—604 (December 31, 1970). 2
21. States can, if they wish, establish higher standards than those established by the 2
EPA under provisions of the Act. QuIIDT MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 443
the achieve the primary and secondary standards. But it has already become
na- obvious that some large urban areas will have extreme difficulty in meet-
and ing the primary standards by 1973. EPA has already granted 2-year ex-
and tensions to 18 states with such problem areas.22 Other regions enjoy levels
evi- of air quality above the secondary standards, and a recent Federal Dis-
ub- trictCourt ruling enjoins the EPA from approving state implementation
est- plans that would allow significant deterioration of existing air quality in
such regions.23
Metropolitan areas with serious problems of meeting primary standards
would have, in terms of our approach, an objective function of the follow-
ing form:
T +
mm (1 + r)'
le a
ient subject to a set of ambient air constraints on pollutants, of the form
Pri- ￿ whereis the concentration per specified time period of
md- pollutantandis the national standard for maximum concentration
i of pollutant i.
Ifur This approach to air quality management requires detailed knowledge
oto- of the cost and production functions of the various means available to
rieet state and local governments for reducing pollution at its sources and con-
.n a trolling its spatial and temporal distribution. An essential element is
uto- some means or model of relating changes in quantities and rates of poiiu-
s be tion at the sources to changes in concentration in the general environ-
ions ment of the airshed. Although such air quality models are now
ards in common use in air quality management, their predictive reliability in
:ors, complex airsheds with many emission sources is not high. Also, the costs
cm- of various means of control, including fuel and process changes, emission
control devices, and timing of emissions are not well understood. Thus,
tlity the task of attaining a least-cost means of achieving the national stan-
ito dards is a formidable one.
A more fundamental issue is raised, however, by the primary national
standards for ambient air quality. They are based on heaLth criteria
Air- which are admittedly incomplete and 'somewhat controversial." 24 Inso-
ental
hiid
sdus- 22. This extension was declared invalidby the Court of Appeals of the District of
ment Columbia on January 31, 1973. The ruling requires the States to submit implementa.
LC 315 tion plans by April 15, 1973, as required by the Clears Air Act. "Natural Resources Dc-
tense Council v, EPA," LawlveekVol. 41: p. 2,400.
23. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 4 ERC 1205, 2 ELR 20262 (D.D.C. 1972).
the 24. EnvironmentalQuality, ThirdAnnual Report of Council on Environmental
Quality, p. 7.444 - MAYNARDHUFSCHMIDT M
far as can be determined no specific information on the cost of achieving
these standards in the most difficult problem areas was used in establish- SO
ing the standards.25 It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the im- ad
plicit weightor opportunity cost associated with meeting national stan-
dards will vary widely among communities. 'Within some reasonable SO
range, ambient air quality standards should reflect both the health effects de
and the opportunity costs of achieving the standards; and because oppor- eq
tunity costs are likely to vary widely, no single set of national standards CO
can meet this test. pri
In summary, the United States has adopted a strategy combining the Pri.
national minimum ambient air standards approach, with strict national
emission controls on major new sources, both stationary and mobile. In
attempting to achieve national emission standards on 1975 and 1976 model ar1
automobiles and on major new industrial plants, the EPA will be forced to
balance costs and technological feasibility against the levels of residual en1
emissions to be allowed anti the timing of required actions. It is assumed
that both industry and the federal government will strive for least-cost CO
means of meeting emission standards for new sources, and the government
has attempted to explore the cost implications of national emission stan-
dards. But, differential local cost implications of meeting national am- of1
bient air standards were not taken into account in setting these standards; CII!
in effect the fedei-al government is imposing implicit a'S of unknown, but in
probably high, values on problem communities. In any event, the a'S, are
likely to have a wide range of values as among communities. tI'
Ii
The United Kingdom
The British have a long experience in dealing with air pollution. Na- to
tional control over major industrial sources has been in effect for over of
100 years.26 Following the London smog episode of 1954, the Clean Air U
Act of 1956 (subsequently expanded in 1968) was directed at controlling
pollution by domestic smoke; more recently there has been increasing
concern about automobile pollution.
ch
na
25. The Council on Environmental Quality, EPA, and the Department of Commerce 2
sponsoreda series of studies of econonsic impact of meeting air and water quality in I
standards on the general economy and selected key industries most likely to be severely hit
affected. But microeconomic studies of costs of meeting such stantlards in problem urban in
areas were not included in these analyses. See The Economic Impact of Pollution Con- 19
trol, U.S.G.P.O., March, 1972.
26. The Alkali Act of 1863; current industry legislationis embodied in the Alkali,
etc. Works Regulation Act, 1906 and the Alkali, etc. Works Order, 1966. go
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British policy is almost exclusively directed at control of emission
sources. No national or local ambient air quality standards have been
adopted; nor is there any strong pressure to do so.
• The historic British approach, developed in control of industrial
sources by the Alkali Inspector, is labeled "best practicable means." Un-
der this approach, the Government requires industries to install control
equipment, based on the best available technology, to the extent that
costs are within reach of the industrial organizations concerned.27 "Best
practicable means" is defined in the context of changing technology, the
he prevailing political and economic climate, and public attitudes toward
lal pollution; in the rare case of dispute over a specific case, the meaning is
interpreted by the courts. The system is quite flexible, and although there
tel are no formal emission standards, the Alkali Inspectorate is able to adopt
working emission standards or "presumptive limits" as a result of experi-
ial ence with different types of plants.28 There is some evidence that working
ed standards are being upgraded, under the influence of increased public
)St concern for the environment.
nt The means to be used may include changes of fuel or production proc.
ess, control at points of emission from the plant, and decisions on height
of chimneys. Some consideration is given to existing pollution in the vi-
cinity, and topography, micrometeorology, and presence of tall buildings
in establishing height of chimneys.
Control of pollution from domestic smoke, whose source has been the
traditional British open grate fire, is in the hands of local authorities.
The Clean Air Acts of 1956 and 1968 give local authori ties power to estab-
lish "smoke control areas" within which all smoke emissions are illegal.
In such areas, householders and other establishments have been required
Ia- to switch to use of smokeless fuels. Local authority grants to householders
'er of 70 per cent of the cost of conversion are available.29 Spectacular reduc-
tir tions in smoke emissions have been achieved in some urban areas, notably
ng
27.As of 1970, 2.200 industrialplants, mainly electricity generation, cement,ceramics,
chemical, petroleum and petro-chemical, anti iron andsteel, wereregulated by the
national Alkali Inspectorate; 30,000 other industrial premises were under control of
some 1,100 local governments. The Protection of the Environment, p. 6.
rce 28. World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, Long Term Programme
lity in Environmental Pollution Control in Europe: Trends and Developments in Air Pol-
ely lution Control in Europe, Copenhagen, 1971, pp. 8—9. See also U. K. Ministry of Hous-
)an ing and Local Government, 106th Annual Report on Alkali, etc. lVorks, 1969, H.M.S.O.,
1970, and U. K. Programmes Analysis Unit, An Economic and Technical Appraisal of
Air Pollution in the United Kingdom, Chilton, Didcot, Berks, 1972.
ali, 29. Of the total cost of conversion, the central government bears 40 per cent, local
government 30 per cent, and the householder, 30 per cent.
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London, but some areas in the north of England have made little prog-
ress, and in 1970 the Government was considering using its powers under ph
the 1968 Clean Air Act to compel laggard local authorities in badly pol- rel
luted areas to make smoke control orders3° Wli
As of 1971, Britain had not developed a national program of automo- av
bile emission control remotely comparable to that in the United States, ad
The British attitude at that time is reflected in two quotations: "In Eu- qu
rope, due to the difference in climatic conditions, air pollution from
petrol-engined vehicles presents a different and less acute problem (than
in problem sections of the United States), and the development of a corn- TI1
pletely pollution-free car might not be the most sensible use of re-
sources" 31 and "There is no firm evidence in Britain that the present level tiV1
of pollutants (emitted by road vehicles) is a hazard to health, even in busy real
city streets, although smoke from diesel engines can be very offensive." 32
Britain is carefully watching experiences in the United States and coun-
tries in Western Europe and is conducting research along a number of
fronts including the health effects of long-term exposure to automobile w
emissions.33
In contrast to the United States, Britain has not attempted to impose
national ambient air quality standards; in terms of our model, it has not
elevated the air quality objective to the level of a constraint that must be Ti
met. Expert opinion is skeptical that such minimum standards on specific Cc
pollutants can, in fact, be directly related to human health. Also, in con- mi
trast to the United States, Britain has not emphasized modelling and re- tic
search on relating emissions to ambient air quality on an airshed basis. an,
There is little or no information on the levels and national distribution a
of pollutants other than smoke and sulfur dioxide.34 In terms of our eli
model, tile production functions are not used to provide information Ai
for formulating specific air pollution control measures. Major industrial- fis
source emissions are controlled as uniformly as possible throughout the tiC
country and, except under special circumstances, the control require-
ments that are imposed do not vary with the amount of air pollution al- pr
ready existing in the area. On the other hand, the British are extremely stat
sensitive to cost of control. The "best practicable means" approach em-
phasizes least-cost means of reducing harmful emissions, and stops short
of levels of control at which marginal costs become exorbitant.
30. The Protection of the Environment, p. 9.
31. The Protection of the Environment, p. 11.
3 32. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, First Report, p. 12.
33. U. K. Programmes Analysis Unit, Appraisal of Air Pollution.
34. U. K. Programmes Analysis Unit, Appraisal of Air Pollution. gDT
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- Insummary, the British system emphasizes the cost functions, and
places little emphasis on defining local emission—ambient air quality
relationships or air quality—benefit functions. Itis a national system
which, through rejection of national minimum ambient air standards,
to- avoids high a's in regional airsheds, but which makes no pretense to
achievement of least-cost means of attaining specific levels of ambient air
quality. The implicit national weight given to air quality, as related to
economic development as conventionally measured, appears to be lower
than the weight inferred from United States policy, if not performance.
The British have consistently worked toward achieving air quality goals
re- since 1956, and the weight given to the goals appears to be increasing rela-
iel tive to other national goals. But the British have attempted to strike a
reasonable and consistent balance between reduction of emissions and the
32 costsof doing so.
In-
of
ile Water Quality Programs
)se The United States
(Ot
be The trend of national policy as revealed in the Federal Water Pollution
1k Control Act of 1965 and the recently enacted 1972 Amendments is toward
more uniform national standards on all streams, coupled with strict fla-
re- tional effluent standards on point sources, based upon "best practicable"
is. and 'best available" technology.35 The 1972 Amendments establish as
a national goal that discharge of pollutants into navigable waters be
ur eliminated by 1985. This and the generous financing provisions of the
Dfl Amendments(total authorizations of $24.6 billion over the next three
al- fiscal years) go far beyond the Administration's original recommenda-
he tioris.36
re- Passing over the details of the complex and changing water quality
al- programs and policy of the United States, we can summarize the current
status and trends as follows:
)rt 1. The requirements that states develop federally-acceptable stream
standards and implementation plans, presumably related to existing
35. Public Law 92—500.
36. The President has recently reduced the allotment of waste treatment construction
grants from $11.2 billion provided by the Act for fiscal years 1973 and 1974 to $5 billion.448 - MAYNARDHUFSCHMIDT
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and projected uses of streams, are consistent with a regional water
quality management approach in which standards and means for
achieving them could be developed in a benefit-cost or least-cost frame-
work. Yet, as the Delaware Estuary example has shown, even where the
least-cost means of achieving various quality levels have been developed
through detailed systems analysis, the least-cost solution was rejected
tre in favor of an "equitable apportionment" means which was signifi-
cantly more costly.37
2. With few exceptions, there has been no serious, consistent attempt
to relate point-source effluent requirements to ambient water quality.
Secondary treatment is now generally regarded as a uniform require-
h ment, and in certain problem areas, tertiary treatment of point sources
is being strongly advocated. Only now is the federal government be- tfl
coming aware of the possibility that complete point-source control of
tr
pollution in some basins may have only limited effects on stream qual-
ity of some important reaches, because of the dominance of pollutants
arising from uncontrolled runoff.38
3. The trend in national legislation toward strong point-source efflu-
a
ent control, through federal permits, strict effluent standards, and ma-
jor subsidies for construction (but not for operation) of local public
lea treatment plants, is almost sure to lead to extremely high private and
A public costs, and to inability to even approach least-cost solutions. on Prohibitive costs may well be avoided as the terms "best practicable an means" and "best available means" are interpreted in the bargaining
process between industry and regulatory agencies. But failure to relate
these regulatory and subsidy measures to a regional water quality man-
agement framework, which ties all major sources of pollutants (point
and nonpoint) to ambient water quality, will lead to grossly inefficient
uses of national sources. to
In terms of our model, current U.S. policy, at least in principle, seeks to:
mm
37. See Edwin Johnson, "A Study in the Economics of Water Quality Management," to
Water Resources Research Vol.3, No. 2 (1967):303 and Ralph Porges,'Regional th Water Quality Standards," Journal of the Sanitary Engineering Division, Proceedings
of the ASCE(June1969): 427.
38. Environmental Quality, p. 16. we
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ped subject to meeting specific effluent standards often expressed as levels of
treatment (secondary, tertiary),
Jifi-
ity. The have been set often with little regard to the cost of meeting
ire- them. The havebeen set without any regard to the differential con-
ces tribution to stream quality that may be involved in uniform application
pe- throughout the nation, a state, or a water quality region.
'of Insufficient emphasis is given to defining the production function
tal- [y = 1(x)]betweenresource inputs to pollution control measures (x) and
fltS "outputs" in terms of improvements in water quality [(y) which is almost
always a vector].
flu- The 1972 Amendments do include some extremely worthwhile provi-
na- sions for water quality research, planning, and management that may
)1IC lead to significant improvements in the long run. For example, the EPA
nd Administrator is authorized to conduct, antI provide grants for, research
'flS. on almost all aspects of pollution; problem sources, physical, economic,
ble and social effects, and methods of management and control. Substantial
Lng grants are provided to states for comprehensive planning and develop.
ate ment of long-range programs. Area-wide waste treatment management
plans, focused primarily on large metropolitan areas, are required to
mt be established, providing opportunities for achieving economies of scale.
flt While these research, planning, and management provisions are likely
to lead to long-term payoffs, they will have little effect on improving the
to: efficiency of expenditure of the $18 billion of federal construction grants
authorized for the three fiscal years 1973—1975.
Until recently, the United States has invested very little in water qual-
ity management in relation to the seriousness of the pollution problem.
Limited resources have forced at least a modest amount of engineering
type least-cost discipline, even though more systematic economic ap-
proaches to regional water quality management have been dismissed as
too complex, impractical, or even as giving a 'license to pollute." Now
that major resources are being committed to the cleanup task, however,
the need for systematic approaches is much greater; as a very minimum
we need a strategy of avoiding prohibitively costly projects, and insuring450 MAYNARD HUFSCHMIDT
that major resources are not committed to projects that have oniy minor
effect on water quality.
aj
The United Kingdom Ic
Since 1951, new discharges of industrial or sewage effluent require con-
sent of the applicable River Authorities, and since 1961 all such dis-
charges, including those in existence before October 1, 1951, require such
consent. Although consent may be refused, the law stipulates that it 'is
not to be unreasonably withheld.' No uniform effluent standards are im-
posed by law, but in practice most River Authorities have adopted the
standards developed by a Royal Commission in 1912. These so-called
Royal Commission standards have become the norm in British pollution
control.35
Ambient or in-stream water quality standards are not used, and there
is only a tenuous link between effluent standards and in-stream water
quality objectives.
As of 1970 there was still widespread noncompliance with the consent tC
conditions established by the River Authorities. Only about one-half of 0
the reporting municipalities were in compliance with Royal Commission
standards. Surprisingly, industrial compliance was reported to be better t2
than that of municipalities. In the absence of specific national grants for 5L
sewage treatment, Britisl1 communities (as, until recently, in the United It
States) placed low priority on investments in sewage treatment. Although
national loans are available for these investments, the long drawn out
technical review of such projects by the national ministry concerned pro- 11
vides another excuse for local communities to delay. In summary, the
British have had only partial success after 20 years of effort in achieving e
compliance with effluent standards whose norm (the Royal Commission
standards) are not overly stringent—perhaps equivalent to or slightly a:
better than a good-practice secondary treatment plant in the United
States. dl
Evenwith this mixed record, ambient river quality has shown some S(
improvement over the past 15 years. A 1970 survey of conditions in Eng- ti
land and Wales showed that, compared with 1958, the percentage of mile- P
age of grossly polluted nontidal rivers (4.38 per cent) antI of tidal rivers
(11.7 per cent) had declined, while, at the other extreme, percentage of
ti
39. Taken for Granted: Report of the Working Party on Sewage Disposal, U. K. Min-
istry of Housing and Local Government/The Welsh Office, H.M.S.O., 1970, p. 7.DT MAI4ACEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 451
or mileage of unpolluted rivers (76.2 per cent) had increased. 'While overall
gains were modest, the line had been held against deterioration.40
Under leadership of the National Water Resources Board, a systematic
approach to planning for water resource management was undertaken
for the River Trent, which in its upper and middle reaches is now grossly
polluted. The objectives of the study, which was in the form of a multi-
disciplinary research program, were as follows:
1. "To determine the different ways in which the River Trent, its
IS tributaries and other waters in, or which can be brought into, the Trent
area may be used to satisfy the expected demands in that area, or else-
where, for water for domestic, industrial, agricultural, and amenity use,
of quality suitable for each."
2. "To evaluate the costs and benefits of each of those ways as a
re guide to determining the most efficient solution."
:er
The River Trent study represents the first major attempt in Britain
nt to apply benefit-cost analysis and systems analysis techniques, including
of computer modeling to problems of water quantity and quality of an en-
art tire river basin. The need for more systematic analysis than that under-
:er taken by staffs of the River Authorities was well recognized by profes.
'or sionals in the Water Resources Board, the Department of the Environ-
ed ment, and the national water research institutes. In the River Trent re-
search studies the British were adapting United States water resource
Ut systems theory and practice, including such examples as the Delaware
River Estuary Study, to their major problems of water quantity and qual-
he ity, which had historically been dealt with by separate local agencies and
ng even by separate professional and research groups.
The fleecE for merging the planning and management of water quantity
and quality led the Government in late 1971 to propose creation of ten
ed new, multipurpose regional water authorities to replace the 29 existing
river authorities.42 The new authorities will assume all of the water con.
ne servation, water quality control, recreation, and navigation responsibili.
ig. ties of the existing authorities as well as the water supply and sewage dis-
le. posal responsibilities previously performed by local governments, and re-
of
40. Report of a River Pollution Survey inEngland and ll'ales,1970, Department of
the Environrneiir/TIie Welsh Office, H.M.S.O., London, 1971.
41. Water Resources Board, Trent Research Program, Interim Report, Reading, 1970.
Ifl. 42."Reorganization of and Sewage Services, Government Proposals and Ar-
rangenicnts for Consultation," Department of the Environment, December 2, 1971.452 MAYNARD HUFSCHMIDT
sponsibilities for canals and river navigation previously discharged by the
central government. In effect, these ten agencies will be comprehensive
river basin management organizations with authority to develop new re-
sources and to regulate water abstractions and emissions.
In terms of our model, British water quality management has been
characterized by a concern for costs. Although effluent standards (the
Royal Commission norms) have constituted the principal management
strategy, in practice cost has been an important element in the design and
timing of investments to meet the standards. Until recently, as in the
Thames and Trent River studies, production function relationships be-
tween resource inputs in treatment plants and ambient stream quality
have not been investigated in detail. In the past 20 years, only two na-
tional surveys of in-stream quality were conducted, one in 1958 and the
second in 1970. As stated above, no national in-stream quality standards
are imposed.
The Trent studies and the reorganization of river authorities point to
probable adoption by Britain of some elements of the Knçese water qual-
ity management approach, with concern for developing relationships be-
tween effluents and in-stream quality, systematic search for least-cost
means for achieving higher levels of stream quality, and possible use of
charges to control effluents and finance needed investments. Emphasis on
the Royal Commission effluent standards will decrease, as other manage-
ment alternatives such as river purification lakes and timing of releases
of effluents will receive increasing attention. Benefit measurement, espe-
cially of recreation and fisheries, will play a modest role. Most important,
each river authority will have rather complete control of planning and
management of water quantity and quality, subject only to broad na-
tional policy and financial constraints.
The objective function of a typical river authority will probably be of
the form
7' +
mm 1 + r)'
subject to a set of local ambient water quality standards
￿ Qt
Theset of wouldnot be fixed a priori, but would be selected par-
ametrically; that is, the cost implications of moving from one level of
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e Perhaps a set of effluent standards, based on the Royal Commission
model,
QI￿QP,
wouldalso be present at least for a time.
a Conclusion
C
In the United States, practice in air and water quality management has
Y lagged far behind the developed theory of regional management on an
airshed or watershed basis. Although some attention is given to regional
management for achieving least-cost, or greatest net benefit solutions,
S U.S. policy has been moving toward adoption of uniform minimum
national standards for both ambient air and water quality and for control
of effluents, with inadequate regard for the cost-effectiveness of these
approaches. In contrast, Britain has operated its air and water quality
management programs with little concern for the theory of regional qua!-
ity management, but with concentration on levels of effluent control that
can be obtained at reasonable cost. Britain now appears ready to move
toward the regional water quality management approach, and to supple-
ment its reasonable cost of treatment strategy with one of finding least-
cost means of meeting various levels of ambient stream standards.
One can summarize by noting that the United States is long on the
theory of optimization and short on its practice; while the British, some-
what skeptical of optimization approaches that involve large investments
of research and information, are more likely in the short-run to develop
a reasonable application of the theory, at least in the water resource field.
COMMENT
A. Myrick Freeman, III, Bowdoin College
In this paper Professor Hufschmidt has examined the environmental
management policies of the United States and the United Kingdom from
the point of view of a public investment analyst and has attempted to
infer something about the nature of the implied objective functions from
the laws and other public documents. The paper includes some very use-
Eul descriptive material on the present shape of air and water pollution
control policies in both countries. I found these descriptions and the corn-454- MAYNARDHUFSCI{MIDT
parisons of basic approaches to be very informative. But I am uneasy
about those parts of the paper that include statements about the form of
the objective function and the implied weights or relative values placed
on economic efficiency and environmental quality. My skepticismis
grounded in a doubt that the political system articulates consistent weights
or values.
First I will discuss the concept of an objective function and two kinds
of uses to which it can be put. Then I will outline a model of the political
system and use it to interpret the political response to the environmental
problem. This model and the interpretation of U.S. pollution control
policy are offered as alternatives to Hufschmidt's analysis of the situation.
Finally I will turn to some specific observations concerning Hufschmidt's
interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
Basically the role of an objective function is to reduce unlike or non-
commensurable objects or states to some common measure such as dol-
lars, utility, or social welfare. This is done through the use of weights or
valuations to transform noncommensurate values into commensurate or
additive values. The resulting summation is an index of the degree to
which a given project or program achieves the goals embodied in or ex-
pressed by the weights.
When they are available and when certain conditions are met, we can
use market prices as the weights. An objective function using market
prices or market-related shadow prices is said to be based on an efficiency
criterion. But for some kinds of outputs or states, such as environmental
quality and income distribution, there may not be any prices or weights
revealed by the market for making these outputs commensurate with
other elements in the objective function. We then have what is sometimes
called the 'multiple objective problem." The multiple objectives referred
to are those other objectives or criteria in addition to economic efficiency.
The problem arises from the absence of market determined weights or
values for converting the different objectives into a common rubric. The
multiple objective problem is a problem of valuation.' Hufschmidt's pa-
per is about the value or weight attached to environmental quality.
It is appropriate to distinguish between two kinds of analysis which
make use of the concept of an objective function. The first I would char-
acterize as normative analysis or policy design. One engaged in this form
1. See A. Myrick Freeman, III, "Project Design and Evaluation withMultipleOb-
jectives,'The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System—A
Compendium of Papers (Washington,D.C.,U. S. Government Printing Office,1969).
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of analysis takes an objective function as given or postulates it, and fol-
lows the function through to its logical conclusions. The aim is to rank
or compare different projects or programs.
Of course a basic question here is where the analyst gets the objective
function and what elements and weights should go into it? This has
sparked a debate whether economists should use an objective function
limited to economic effciency (i.e., those outputs to which prices can be
attached) or whether it should include income distribution and now en-
vironmental quality as arguments.
I will not pursue this question. This is not Hufschmidt's topic. But I
want to observe that this debate has induced some economists to under-
take a different kind of analysis, something which I would characterize as
the positive analysis of objective functions. By this I mean the formula.
tion and testing of hypotheses about the elements of and weights of the
objective functions actually used by policy makers.2 Or to put it differ-
ently, this work represents an attempt to infer a revealed objective func-
tion from the observed choices or actions taken by policy makers.
The logic behind the positive analysis of objective functions is clear. If
the terms at which one output (e.g., income redistribution) can be ex-
changed for another (e.g., efficiency) are known, that is if the marginal
rate of transformation among outputs is known; if the actual position on
the MRT surface chosen by policy makers is known; and if, in rough
terms, rationality or consistency in public choice is assumed, then the
implied marginal rate of substitution or valuation of one output in terms
of the other can be readily calculated.3 It is the assLLmption of rationality
which is most troublesome.
I see Hufschmidt's paper as a somewhat in formal kind of positive analy-
sis of the relative weights given to environmental values and economic
efficiency values as revealed by recent policy decisions. It is this aspect of
the paper which is most troubLesome to me. And the basis of my appre-
hension is the kind of political model which I believe underlies Huf-
schmidt's analysis.
2. See, for example, Robert H. Havcman. Water Resources investment and the Pub-
lic interest (Nashville: \'anderbilt University Press. 1965); Burton Wcisbrod, 'Income
Redistribution Effects and Benefit Cost Analysis," in Samuel B. Chase. editor. Prob-
lems in PublicExfenditure Analysis(Washington, D.C.: TheBrookingsInstitution,
1968); A. Myrick Freeman, III, "Income Distribution and Social Choice: A Pragmatic
Approach," Public Choice VII (Fall 1969): 3—21; and K. Mera, 'Experimental Deter-
mination of Relative Marginal Utilities," Quarterly Journal of Economics 83, No. 3
(August 1969).
3. See Freeman, "Income Distribution and Social Choice."1
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One can only impute some normative significance for policy analysis
to revealed choices if the assumptions described above are satisfied. And
if one wishes to pursue this line of inquiry, it is appropriate to ask, "Vt'hat
is your model of or theory of the political process which encourages you
to assume these conditions are met?" At issue is whether Congress and the
agencies have made or ever can make choices about trade-oils which are
internally consistent and in accord with generally accepted value judg-
ments or criteria.
One of the strongest advocates of this type of analysis is Arthur Maass.4
Maass' discussions emphasize "community-oriented choices" which reflect
the general interests of society as a whole. Maass argues that decision
makers give different answers to questions depending on the way in
which the question is framed and the environment in which the decision
maker is called upon to make his choices. Also he argues that we can and
should create government institutions for the "purpose of framing the
question so as to elicit the right, or in our case, community-oriented, re-
sponse."
Maass' rather informal model is quite different from and at odds with
the political models of Downs, McKean, Wildavsky, and Margolis. The
latter are micromodels of the political process. They assume that individ-
uals acting in the political process are utility maximizers who assess the
gains and costs to themselves of tl1e choices they make. Some of these
models emphasize the fact that the gains and costs as perceived by deci-
sion-makers may be quite different from the social benefits and costs of
these decisions. These models cast doubt on the likelihood that public
choices will be either internally consistent over time and across programs
or in conformity with generally acceptable value judgments. For exam-
pie, what kind of objective function can be inferred from public policy
decisions concerning the Aid to Dependent Children program, depletion
allowances, and the Farm Price Support Program.
I dont propose that the question of which kind of model applies (if
either) has been settled, or that much progress has been made. We need a
far better understanding of the political decision-making process before ti
we offer interpretations about the results of this process in terms of social
welfare or objective functions. 'We also should be cautious about giving
officials more advice about how to incorporate environmental quality or
4, See Arthur Maass, "Benefit-Cost Analysis:Its Relevance toPublic Investment
Decisions,' Quarterly Journal of Economics 79, No. 2 (May 1966): 208—226; and Arthur
Maass,Public Investment Planning in the United States:Analysis and Critique,"
Public Policy 18, No. 2 1970): 211—243.
5. Maass, "Public Investment Planning," pp. 236—238.I
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incomedistribution or regional development into their multiple-objective
I decision-making processes. Our analytical techniques are way ahead of
our understanding of how these techniques are used and perhaps per-
verted in the political process, or even whether they will be used.
Hufschmidt does not provide us with a model of the political process to
help in interpreting the policy action he studies. But I would argue that
L theimplicit model underlying Hufschmidt's paper is more like that of
Maass than those of Downs, McKean, et. al. In this section I will briefly
sketch out an alternative micromodel of the political process and use it to
interpret recent U.S. environmental policies with respect to air and water
pollution control. This model focuses attention on both those policy
makers who are responsible for setting and carrying out pollution control
policies and the places in the political structure where decisions on policy
I are made.6
One of the functions of a political system is to reconcile or resolve
- conflictinginterests. Many of these interests are economic in nature. With
respect to the pollution issue, the conflict is over how much cleaning up
of pollution is actually going to be done, and who is going to pay for it.
An important element in understanding the politics of pollution is to
see whether a given policy step resolves this conflict or attempts to ob-
scure the conflict or postpone its effective resolution.
The political actors include the elected legislators and administrators
- aswell as the appointed bureaucrats who are charged with carrying out
or enforcing pollution control policies. Each of the political actors has
a constituency, i.e., a group whose diverse views the actor must take into
S account when making decisions, because the constituency controls or at
- leastaffects his political future. The constituencies of the elected officials
/ 4 includeall eligible voters; but in some cases, for example congressional
I committee chairmen, they include other elements as well. The constitu-
encies of the bureaucrats include members of the legislative body, espe-
1 cially committee chairmen, senior bureaucrats and elected officials who
control appointments and programs, and the specific groups affected by
the policies or programs under the supervision of the bureaucrats.
Political actors may be thought of as maximizing a utility function
which, in the case of elected officials, would depend upon electoral sup-
r port. For bureaucrats, arguments in the utility function could include
prestige, probability of promotion, budget and program size, and prob-
ability of moving to lucrative private employment at a later date.
6. See also A. Myrick Freeman, III and Robert H. Haveman, "Clean Rhetoric and
Dirty Water,"ThePublic Interest No. 28 (Summer 1072): 63—65.
.. ----i1
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If an elected official chooses a policy which takes something away from
a group, lie may lose the support of that group. He would be more likely
to choose such a policy if the losers were small in number and/or ability
to influence other elements of his support. In general political actors
have incentives to find policies which hide the costs or shift the costs to
less influential elements of their constituencies, to postpone decisions
(every decision has a cost), and to avoid the costs of the decision by shift-
ing the responsibility for making it to another place in the political
system.
An important element of the model is the locus of the actual decision,
i.e., where in the political structure the final decision which resolves the
conflict and distributes the benefits and costs is actually made. In exam-
ining the locus of decision making, two criteria are relevant: accountabil-
ity and accessibility. Ideally political actors should be accountable to all
groups affected by their decisions; an(l all affected groups should have
access to the locus of decision. However, such perfection does not charac-
terize our political system. Institutional arrangements such as the con-
gressional seniority system and loose campaign financial regulations that
enable economic power to be transformed into political power undermine
both accountability and accessibility. When such structural imperfections
persist, political actors gain leeway to avoid those decisions likely to
alienate major sources of support.
At least in part on the basis of this model, I am led to a quite different
interpretation of the U.S.'s political response to the environmental prob-
lem. The principal feature of federal legislation dealing with air and
water pollution is that responsibility for implementing pollution control
plans is assigned to the states. Each state is required to set air and water
quality standards and to develop and implement programs for attaining
these standards. For the most part states have chosen the enforcement-reg-
ulation approach based on the issuance of permits to individual discharg-
ers and backed up by case-by-case legal enforcement of detected violations.
I want to emphasize three aspects of the federal policy.
1. Federal legislators have consistently shifted the burden for making
difficult decisions to the states (for example the setting of standards, or
the issuing of discharge permits), or to decision makers within the fed-
eral bureaucracy (EPA).T Furthermore the guidelines accompanying
7. The shift awayfromreliance on states under a federal framework and toward
federally imposed standards which are the principal features of the Clean Air Act of
1970 and the Clean \Vater Amendments of 1972 is not inconsistent with the model4.
OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 459
thesedelegations of authority have been vague and poorly defined
leaving considerable discretion to the ultimate decision makers and ex-
panding the scope for negotiation and bargaining on a case-by-case
basis. As a result, those who make the real decisions about who cleans
up how much are typically both less accountable and less accessible
than the legislators who pass the basic legislation. Federal legislation
typically passes with large majorities, sometimes unanimously. One can
only conclude—if everybody is for it they must have found some way
to duck the real issue.
2. Setting environmental quality standards is a meaningless exercise
unless effective mechanisms are developed for achieving the standards.
Almost without exception, states have placed primary reliance on some
form of licensing accompanied by judicial enforcement of the license
terms. The political aspects of this procedure are quite unfavorable to
effective pollution control.8 The adoption of a licensing system does
not resolve the political conflicts inherent in pollution policy. Instead,
there is a continuing political conflict over license applications, terms
and limits on discharges, and enforcement. Furthermore, these battles
are fought on terms that are advantageous to dischargers for several
reasons. The political issues are removed from the legislative arena and
placed in a bureaucratic one where accountability and accessibility are
less. The choices are more likely to be framed in technical terms that
make it difficult to articulate the public interest. Finally, each dis-
charger has large incentives to devote resources and energy toward
swinging the decision his way; the public interest is diffuse and because
few people have the incentive or the command of resources, likely to be
poorly represen ted.
3. Policy-makers have been willing to subsidize industrial dischargers
wherever this could be hidden in tax.clepreciation formulae or munici-
pal cost.sharing programs.
In sum, the political system has responded to the emerging environ-
mental problem by shifting the real decisions from the federal to the state
sketchedouthere. This shift can bc viewed as a rational political response to public
pressure to dosomething,or at least togivetheappearanceof doingsomething.And
furthennore, itis notatall clear that this greater federalinvolvementrepresents a
movement toward more effective policy. In fact clevclopnients as ofearlyFebruary
1975 suggestanimminent breakdownof the implementation of air qualityprograms
in major urban areas such as New City and Los Angeles.
8. See A. Myrick Freeman, III and Robert H. Haveman, "Residuals Charges for
Pollution Control: A Policy Evaluation,' Science177,No. 4046 Uuly 1972): esp. 328—
329.1
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level and from legislatures to bureaucratic agencies. It has tended to make
decisions in arenas where there is less accountability and accessibility, and
to avoid final resolutions of the political conflicts in favor of piecemeal,
fragmented decisions. All of these tendencies work against the public in-
terest in pollution control.
Now let me offer some comments on the inferences drawn by Huf-
schmidt concerning the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of
1969. Hufschmidt interprets NEPA as raising environmental quality to
the level of a national objective in a multiple-objective function. In a
narrow formal sense this is true, because it is the stated purpose of the Act
itself. But when the Act and the subsequent actions of governmental
agencies are examined from the perspective of the political model pre-
viously outlined, it is not clear that there was any change in federal policy
in an operational sense.
First, although Congress said that environmental values must also be
weighted in the decision process, it placed the responsibility for weighing
these factors and making the actual decisions in the hands of the executive
branch.
Second, Congress gave no guidance as to what kind of analytical frame-
work should be used or what weight should be placed on environmental
considerations relative to other values in the decision process. The exact
language reads, "Will insure that presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decision
making along with economic and technical considerations." But what
meaning can be given toappropriate" in this context?
Finally the agencies to whom the Act is directed have responded in
most part only in a pro forma way. In general the agencies have taken
steps to meet the technical requirements of the Act, i.e., the drafting of
impact statements, but even this has required the prodding of the courts.
But it is difficult to find examples of agencies voluntarily making decisions
which are different than they would have been in the absence of the Act.
Rather there is some justification for the charge that impact statements
have become vehicles for justifying or rationalizing politically predeter-
mined decisions (the Alaskan pipeline is a case in point). In fact one
could argue that the agencies, having been handed a hot potato by Con-
gress, have deftly passed it on to the federal judiciary. Whatever impact
NEPA has had on decision making and environmental policy has come
about through court orders and injunctions rather than through prompt
and bold agency response to a clear statement of national policy ob-
jectives.